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 of the Constitutional Court of Moldova raised interesting 
constitutional property law questions for Moldovan and South African 
constitutional property law. The questions were whether a certificate of 
graduation from a particular institution, required by law for its holder to 
contest for the position of a judge or prosecutor, gave the holder a legitimate 
expectation to gain income from an activity as either a judge or a prosecutor, 
and whether this was an asset within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol 
No 1 to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (“Article 1 ECHR”).
2
 The Constitutional Court of 
Moldova held that the graduates had a legitimate interest that involved a 
material interest, making it an asset for the purposes of Article 1 and therefore 
guaranteed by the property clause found in Article 46 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Moldova (adopted on 29 July 1994, amended and supplemented 
on 5 July 2000) (“Moldovan Constitution”).
The aim of this article is to provide an analysis of the approach the South 
African Constitutional Court took in recent decisions that also dealt with 
novel intangible property interests, such as the decisions of National Credit 
Regulator v Opperman (“Opperman”)
3
 (claim for restitution of money paid), 
Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard (“Hubbard”)
4
 (claim based on unjustified 
enrichment) and Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive 
Council for Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 
Eastern Cape (“Shoprite Checkers”)
5
 (grocer’s wine licence). Interestingly, 
Charles Reich started the debate in the 1960’s about whether licenses and 
government largesse are eligible for property status.
6
 It is clear that this debate 
still dominates modern literature and the question of whether new forms of 
property should be recognised still remains a pressing issue. Reich explains 
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that “[t]o an individual, these new forms, such as a profession, job, or right 
to receive income, are the basis of his various statuses in society, and may 
therefore be the most meaningful and distinctive wealth he possesses”.
7
 Using 
Moldova as the starting point to set out the research problem, this article 
will investigate the extent to which South Africa follows an approach to the 
protection of intangible property interests that resembles German and United 
States of America (“US”) law. It should be noted that the Moldovan case 
is used simply as a marker to facilitate conversation about the recognition 
(and importance) of intangible interests in society, with the ultimate aim of 
determining whether constitutional protection of these “property” interests 
is necessary (and indeed favourable) in South African law. The focus of 
the article is therefore essentially on the direction that South African law is 
moving, and reference to US, Moldovan and German law is made in order to 
benchmark South African law in comparison to these jurisdictions.
2 Setting the scene
2 1 Introduction to the problem
The Moldovan decision dealt with legislation that required persons to 
graduate from the National Institute of Justice in order to apply for a position as 
a judge or a prosecutor. The complainant in this case argued that the limitation 
of the right of graduates from the National Institute of Justice to apply for 
the position of judge or prosecutor to a period of three years, commencing 
from the date of graduation, is incompatible with a number of constitutional 
provisions including Article 46, being the property clause. The Constitutional 
Court analysed the challenged legislation according to the constitutional norms 
referred to by the complainant while also taking the relevant provisions of the 
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“European Convention”) as well as the relevant principles and 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) into account.
8
 
This is because of the prior practice of the Constitutional Court of Moldova 
in applying the principles of the ECHR and the provisions of the European 
Convention.
2 2 Moldovan law
Article 46(1)
9
 of the Moldovan Constitution guarantees the right to 
possess private property. The Constitutional Court of Moldova also applies 
the principles and case law of the ECHR regarding Article 1 ECHR when 
determining whether a particular interest is protectable as private property 
under Article 46(1). Article 1 ECHR states that everyone is entitled to the 




Judgment No 15 of §13-09-2011 para 29.
9 
For the purposes of this article, we focus only on section 46(1) because we deal with the threshold question 
of determining whether an interest qualifies as property for constitutional purposes. We do not focus on 
section 46(2), which states the requirements for the expropriation of property.
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Court has stated that a property right guaranteed by Article 46 is “[…] in its 




2 3 Meaning of “possessions” in Article 1 ECHR
The ECHR interprets the concept of “possessions” broadly.
11
 In its Gasus 
Dosier- und Födertechnik GmbH v The Netherlands judgment,
12
 it decided 
that: 
“[T]he notion ‘possessions’ in Article 1 of Protocol No 1 has an autonomous meaning which is 
certainly not limited to ownership of physical goods: certain other rights and interests constituting 
assets can also be regarded as ‘property rights’ and thus as ‘possessions’, for the purposes of this 
provision. Where the proprietary interest is in the nature of a claim, it may be regarded as an ‘asset’ 




This judgment establishes that the autonomous meaning doctrine
14
 applies to 
Article 1 ECHR and, more specifically, to the interpretation of “possessions”. 
One of the purposes served by the autonomous meaning doctrine is to prevent 
member states from circumventing their obligations under the European 
Convention by simply re-labelling existing private property so as to put 
it beyond the protection of the Convention.
15
 Article 1 ECHR provides no 
10 
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Rijn “Right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1)” in P van Dijk, 
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Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European Convention on Human 
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The ECHR has developed the autonomous meaning doctrine regarding the definition of “possessions” 
for the purposes of Article 1. This doctrine was initially developed with a focus on Article 6 but was later 
used in property disputes. This doctrine allows the ECHR to determine for itself whether a particular 
interest constitutes a possession for purposes of Article 1 without being restricted to the relevant domestic 
law. This prevents the member states from legislating that a particular interest is not property so as to 
frustrate or prevent potential applicants’ claims from being brought before the ECHR. If the interest is 
regarded as property in the relevant domestic law, it will be regarded as a possession for the purpose of 
Article 1. If the interest is not recognised as property in the relevant domestic law, the ECHR will apply 
the autonomous meaning doctrine to determine if the interest in question is a possession for purposes of 
Article 1 or not.
15 
Allen Property 44. See further Allen “The autonomous meaning of ‘possessions’” in Modern Studies 
in Property Law 57 61 where Allen refers to Brumărescu v Romania 2001 33 EHRR 35. In this case, 
a declaration by the Romanian court that reversed earlier judicial declarations that the applicant held 
certain property, was treated as an interference with possessions. 
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guidance or direction regarding the meaning of “possessions”, leaving the 
Strasbourg institutions to determine its scope.
16
 
2 4 Case discussion
The Constitutional Court of Moldova first investigated whether the diploma 
received by the graduates of the National Institute of Justice constituted an 
“asset” for the purposes of Article 46 and Article 1 ECHR.
17
 Based on its prior 
practice, the Court applied the doctrine of the ECHR relevant to this dispute 
that has evolved in the case law of the ECHR. Assets for the purposes of Article 
1 ECHR can be either existing assets or assets, including claims, in respect 
of which the applicant can argue that they have a legitimate expectation that 
they will actually acquire a property right.
18
 Where an interest in property is 
part of the claim, the person who invokes it can be seen as having a legitimate 
expectation if there is a sufficient basis for that interest under national law.19 
The Court reiterated that, as a principle, the term “asset” in Article 1 ECHR has 
an autonomous meaning, independent of formal classification in the national 
law of the member state in question and which is not limited to the ownership 
of tangible property.
20
 The question is whether the circumstances of the case, 
considered together, give the persons concerned a right to a material interest 
protected by Article 1 ECHR.
21
The Constitutional Court of Moldova noted that the ECHR has consistently 
held that a licence to conduct an activity is an asset within the meaning of 
Article 1 ECHR insofar as it provided a right to a material interest, including 
the licence of a lawyer.
22
 Applying the reasoning of the ECHR, the Court 
concluded that the expectation of obtaining a paid job as a result of holding a 
diploma from the National Institute of Justice was a property right in terms of 
Article 46 and Article 1 ECHR because the holder has the opportunity to earn 
income, which implies a material interest.
23
 Furthermore, the graduates had 
a legitimate expectation to access the office of a judge or prosecutor because 
the law stated that such a right existed and that this legitimate expectation 
involved a material interest, thus making it an asset in the sense of the rights 
protected by Article 46 and Article 1 ECHR.
24
 South Africa is another example 
of a relatively young constitutional democracy that has had to deal with the 
question of whether certain intangible interests, similar to the Moldovan 
example illustrated above, can be regarded as constitutional property.
16 
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3 Recent South African law examples
The South African Constitutional Court was recently confronted with the 
question of whether certain intangible interests can be considered property for 
the purposes of section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (“Constitution”). Section 25(1) states that no one may be deprived of 
property unless the deprivation is authorised by law of general application 
and is not arbitrary. While section 25 does not provide a definition of property, 
section 25(4)(b) provides some assistance in determining what constitutes 
property for the purposes of section 25 by stating that property is not limited 
to land. In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister 
of Finance (“FNB”),
25 it was held that comprehensively defining property 
was both impossible and unwise.
26
 Instead, the Constitutional Court uses an 
incremental approach to the determination of whether a particular interest is 





 the Constitutional Court had to determine whether the 
right to restitution of money paid, based on unjustified enrichment, is property 
for the purposes of section 25. The main question before the Constitutional 
Court was whether section 89(5)(c) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 is 
consistent with the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of property, recognised 
in section 25(1) of the Constitution. The High Court concluded that section 
89(5)(c) deprives a credit provider of their goods or money by denying them 
their restitution rights.
29
 Furthermore, the claim has monetary value, can be 
disposed of and transferred and could therefore be counted as an asset in a 
person’s estate and is part of the person’s patrimony.
30
 The Constitutional Court reiterated that assigning a comprehensive 
definition to the term property is neither possible nor wise.31 The right to 
claim restitution on the basis of enrichment is a personal right enforceable only 
against a specific person, in this case the consumer who received the money. 
While it is not a real right like ownership that is enforceable against all, section 
25 is concerned with property and not ownership.
32
 The Constitutional Court 
held that the recognition of the right to restitution of money paid, based on 
unjustified enrichment, as property under section 25(1) is both logical and 
25 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 




Para 51. See further Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 108; I Currie & J De Waal The Bill 
of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 535; T Roux “Property” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2003) 46-10.
28 
National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 BCLR 170 (CC). For a more in-depth discussion of this 
case see R Brits “Arbitrary deprivation of unregistered credit provider’s right to claim restitution of 
performance rendered: Opperman v Boonzaaier (24887/2010) 2012 ZAWCHC 27 (17 April 2012) and 
National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC)” (2013) 16 PELJ 422 434-441; EJ Marais “The 
constitutionality of section 89(6)(c) of the National Credit Act under the property clause: National Credit 
Regulator v Opperman & Others” (2014) 131 SALJ 215 217-222.
29 




Para 60, referring to First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 7 BCLR 702 (CC) para 51.
32 
Para 61.
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realistic and would be in accordance with developments in other jurisdictions 
where personal rights have been recognised as constitutional property.
33
 The 
importance of intangible property in modern-day society means that the 
concept of property should not be construed so narrowly as to diminish the 
worth of the protection provided by section 25(1).
34
 Therefore, an enrichment 




 the Constitutional 
Court confirmed that the right of restitution of money paid based on unjustified 





 the Constitutional Court had to determine whether 
a grocer’s wine licence constituted property for the purposes of section 25. The 
majority judgment of Froneman J and the minority judgment of Madlanga J 
found that this licence is property for the purposes of section 25.
39
 Therefore, 
a grocer’s wine licence is property in terms of section 25. 
In his majority judgment in Shoprite Checkers, Froneman J acknowledged 
the need for a constitutional concept of property that extends beyond the 
private law notion of property to allow for the later inclusion of other potential 
constitutional entitlements that may deserve protection and to ensure that 
section 25 does not become an obstacle to transformation.
40
 Froneman J placed 
the property inquiry within a normative constitutional framework, stating 
that the fundamental values of dignity, equality and freedom necessitate a 
conception of property that allows for individual self-fulfilment in the holding 
of property and recognised that the holding of property also carries with it a 
social obligation not to harm the public good.
41
 Based on this approach, the 
strength of the protection afforded to a particular interest as property depends 
on the extent to which this interest promotes the fundamental rights of dignity, 
equality and freedom. According to this approach, if Shoprite’s interest in 
the grocer’s wine licence is one that could conceivably serve individual self-
fulfilment in the sense of running a business that forms part of its identity 
and dignity, then a finding that this interest is property for the purposes 
of section 25(1) is likely due to the strength of the correlation between the 
holding of the licence and the fundamental right to choose one’s vocation or 
trade.
42 However, if Shoprite, as a commercial corporate entity, does not fit 
the notion of serving individual self-fulfilment, it must be determined whether 












Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 9 BCLR 1052 (CC).
39 
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similar grocer’s wine licences and who could conceivably be entitled to the 
close constitutional connection.
43
 According to Froneman J, a natural person 
in Shoprite’s position would have an easier task of convincing a court that the 
grocer’s wine licence enabled them to conduct a business vocation of their 
choice that is essential to their living a life of dignity.
44
 Shoprite’s holding of 
this property interest as a juristic person merely affects the issue of standing 
and does not affect the objective nature of the constitutional challenge.
45
 
This potential objective link to constitutionally sanctioned self-fulfilment 
coupled with the High Court’s finding that the granting of the licence vests in 
the recipient an enforceable personal incorporeal right to trade in accordance 
with the conditions attached, points towards the fact that this incorporeal right 
is property for constitutional property law purposes. The right is transferable 
subject to approval by the relevant authority, definable, identifiable by persons 
other than the holder, has value and is sufficiently permanent in the sense 
that the holder is protected from arbitrary revocation by the issuing authority. 
Therefore, there is a strong case for its recognition as property.
46
 Therefore, 
Froneman J concluded that the holding of the grocer’s wine licence constitutes 
property for the purposes of section 25(1).
47
 
Rautenbach argues that a few aspects of Froneman J’s approach to the 
property issue in this case are unclear.
48
 Firstly, Froneman J’s establishment 
of a link between the right to property and other rights such as human dignity 
and the right to choose a vocation is inconsistent with section 8(2) of the 
Constitution.
49
 Juristic persons, such as Shoprite in this case, cannot be 
the beneficiaries of certain rights in the Bill of Rights, including the right 
to human dignity. Froneman J attempted to resolve this inconsistency by 
arguing that if the grocer’s wine licence could objectively be regarded as 
constitutional property in the hands of a natural person and the legislation 
regulating that licence also applies to juristic persons, the absence of a link 
to these other rights does not preclude a grocer’s wine licence belonging to 
a juristic person from being recognised as constitutional property as well.
50
 
This solution has the effect of elevating legislative provisions to a higher 
status than constitutional provisions because, while ordinary legislation may 
provide for more entitlements than the Constitution, those entitlements are 
not protected by the Constitution.
51
 The problem with Froneman J’s analysis 
is that it starts with the link between property and other rights as an essential 
characteristic of constitutional property, a problem that does not arise when 
one considers property as a stand-alone right.
52
















Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 9 BCLR 1052 (CC) para 61. See further Rautenbach (2015) TSAR 
826.
51 
Rautenbach (2015) TSAR 826.
52 
826.
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whether Froneman J intended that the existence of this link between property 
and other constitutional rights and values is essential for the recognition of 
constitutional property.
53
Marais argues that Froneman J’s approach of linking the right to property 
with other fundamental rights unnecessarily complicates the question of 
whether an interest should be recognised as property for the purposes of section 
25.
54
 The main problem with this approach is that it “collapses the threshold 
issue (ie does the affected interest amount to constitutional property?) and 
the justification issue (ie does the deprivation satisfy the relevant section 
25(1) requirements?) into one phase”.
55
 According to the methodology set 
out in the FNB decision, the meaning of constitutional property and the level 
of constitutional protection afforded to such property constitute the first 
and third steps for the adjudication of section 25 disputes.
56
 The factors for 
determining whether an interest qualifies as constitutional property differ 
from those used to determine the level of protection that should be afforded 
to such an interest.
57
 
While Madlanga J also concludes in his minority judgment that the 
grocer’s wine licence is property for the purposes of section 25(1), he does 
so based on a very different approach from that of Froneman J. Rejecting 
the notion of linking the protection of property with the promotion of other 
rights, Madlanga J held that the value of the right to property inheres in the 
right as a self-standing unit and is worth protecting as a stand-alone right.
58
 
Furthermore, there is no basis in the Constitutional Court’s previous decisions 
regarding whether rights should be recognised as property for acknowledging 
the relationship between the right to property and other rights.
59
 Referring to 
Opperman, Madlanga J held that the right to restitution of money paid based 
on unjustified enrichment is much further removed from readily acceptable 
property rights than a grocer’s wine licence, but yet it was readily recognised 
as property.
60
 Whereas an enrichment claim may only be enforced against a 
specific party and is rendered valueless by a successful defence of it in court, 
a grocer’s wine licence is something in hand that grants an entitlement to sell 
wine under specific circumstances, may endure indefinitely, has value and 
is transferable. Based on these considerations, Madlanga J concluded that a 
grocer’s wine licence is property for purposes of section 25(1).
61
 
In deciding that the grocer’s wine licence is not property for the purpose of 
section 25, Moseneke DCJ held that the entitlement to commercial trade under 
a state licence does not fit comfortably within the constitutional notions of 
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are never absolute; they are subject to specified pre-conditions and they are 
not freely transferable.
62
 Furthermore, the licence does not vest in its holder, 
but is derived from and open to legitimate state regulation.
63
 Moseneke DCJ 
furthermore found that vesting is still seen by both foreign and South African 
courts as something that prompts the recognition of a right, and therefore for a 
right to constitute property it must be a vested right.
64
 Moseneke DCJ raised the 
question of whether recognising the grocer’s wine licence as property would 
render the definition so wide as to make legislative regulation impracticable 
and concluded that doing so may create difficult property jurisprudence.65
In the Opperman and Shoprite Checkers decisions, the Court used the 
private law notion of property as a starting point to determine whether the 
relevant intangible interest could be regarded as property. Importantly, the 
Court does not end with the private law notion of property. The Court will 
determine if the intangible interest can be regarded as property under a wider, 
constitutional interpretation of property. In this manner, the constitutional 
concept of property is incrementally expanded on a case-by-case basis. This 
avoids the problem of expanding the constitutional concept of property so 
much as to make the regulation of property impossible. The Court will also 
consult foreign law to provide guidance on whether a particular interest should 
be regarded as property for the purposes of section 25. In Opperman, the 
Court held that the right to claim restitution based on unjustified enrichment 
did not fit comfortably within the private law notion of property, however the 
same could not be said for the constitutional notion of property. The Court 
noted that this type of claim was recognised as property in other jurisdictions 
and that its recognition as property for the purpose of section 25 was logical, 
realistic and in line with developments in other jurisdictions. 
However, the judgments in Shoprite Checkers approached the property 
issue differently, with Froneman J and Madlanga J finding that a grocer’s 
wine licence does constitute property for the purposes of section 25 of the 
Constitution, albeit for different reasons, and Moseneke DCJ finding that it 
did not constitute property. Both Froneman J and Madlanga J used private 
law considerations as a foundation for their conclusions that the grocer’s wine 
licence did constitute property. Froneman J coupled these considerations 
with the potential objective link to constitutionally sanctioned self-fulfilment 
to justify the recognition of the grocer’s wine licence as property for the 
purposes of section 25. Madlanga J argued that the grocer’s wine licence was 
more readily recognisable as property for the purpose of section 25 than the 
right to claim restitution based on unjustified enrichment in Opperman and 
that this, coupled with the private law considerations, meant that the grocer’s 
wine licence is property for the purposes of section 25. Using these same 
private law considerations, Moseneke DCJ concluded that the grocer’s wine 
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wine licence does not fit comfortably within the private law notion of property 
and that its recognition would make the definition of constitutional property 
so wide as to make legislative regulation impracticable. The Opperman 
decision better illustrates the Court’s approach in determining whether a 
particular interest is property for purposes of section 25. The decision shows 
that a court begins with the private law notion of property and if the interest 
does not fit well within that notion, a court will then determine if the interest 
can be regarded as property under a wider, constitutional interpretation of 
the concept of property. If so, then the interest will be regarded as property 
and the constitutional definition of property will be expanded to include the 
particular interest. 
4 German and US law
German private law views property as a relationship between persons and 
things in which they have a concrete and vested right, but a much wider range 
of interests are recognised as property for the purposes of Article 14 of the 
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (as amended on and up to 30 
December 1993) (“Basic Law”) than under the German private law definition 
of property.
66
 Article 14 protects the property of a person and not their wealth 
in general.
67 Therefore, Article 14 must be relied on in relation to a specific 
item of property that is recognised as such under Article 14. Tangible things 
are obviously protected under Article 14, but a number of intangible objects 
are also regarded as property for the purposes of Article 14. Examples of 










 are also recognised as property, as well as workers’ 
66 
GS Alexander The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 124-131. See further H Mostert The Constitutional Protection and Regulation 
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67 
Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 119. The US Supreme Court also follows this approach, in 
that it protects only identifiable assets and not general financial interests. See further D Kleyn “The 
constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and South African approach” 
(1996) 11 SAPL 402 414; Mostert The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property 227-229; 
Alexander The Global Debate 127-128.
68 
BVerfGE 31, 229 (1971) (Urheberrecht), discussed in Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 147 
and translated in DP Kommers & RA Miller The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic 
of Germany 3 ed (2012) 651-654. See further Mostert The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of 
Property 233-234. 
69 
BVerfGE 51, 193 (1979) (Warenzeichen), discussed in Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 118. See 
further Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 152; Mostert The Constitutional Protection and 
Regulation of Property 233-234.
70 
BVerfGE 83, 201 (1991) (Vorkaufsrecht), discussed in Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 118. See 
further Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 152; Mostert The Constitutional Protection and 
Regulation of Property 230.
71 
BVerfGE 42, 263 (1976) (Contergan), discussed in Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 118. See 
further Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 152-153; Mostert The Constitutional Protection 
and Regulation of Property 230. 
INTANGIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY 633
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
rights
72
 and certain public-law participation rights.
73
 Despite this wide 
constitutional view of property adopted by the German Federal Constitutional 
Court (Bundesverfas-sungsgericht) (“BVerfG”), it has nevertheless held that 
intangible interests are only recognised as property once they have vested in 
the beneficiary of the interest in accordance with the law on the basis of own 
investment or performance and not merely on the basis of contingent interests 
or expectations.
74
The BVerfG embraces a wide concept of property, subject to the require-
ments that recognised rights must be both concrete in nature and vested.
75
 
Only specific assets are regarded as property for purposes of the Basic Law 
and not a person’s general wealth or financial status.76 The wider notion of 
property that the BVerfG developed on the basis of a general constitutional 
principle allows for future extrapolation of the concept of property.
77
 In line 
with this principle, the BVerfG has held that it is for the courts to bring the 
range of objects to be protected under Article 14 in line with developments 
in private law as well as with social needs in general, thereby extending the 
concept of property to new objects continuously as the need arises.
78
US law also views property as a relationship between people with regard to 
things and not between people and things, even in private law.
79
 The question 
of whether a particular interest or object constitutes property plays a relatively 
minor role in the adjudication of property disputes under this view, which 
allows for a wide range of interests to fall under the property protection 
72 
BVerfGE 50, 290 (1979) (Mitbestimmung), discussed in Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 
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Protection and Regulation of Property 238; Alexander The Global Debate 100, 114.
73 
BVerfGE 69, 272 (1985) (Eigenleistung), discussed in Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 118. 
See further Kleyn (1996) SAPL 421; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 156-157; Mostert The 
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74 
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 Amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States of America, 1787 (“US Constitution”) without much 
concern for any differences between private- and constitutional law. What is 
at issue in property disputes under US law are the rights and duties pertaining 
to the legal relationship between the parties in so far as these rights and duties 
pertain to property interests.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution, read together, 
provide protection for property.
82
 These two clauses are usually referred to as 
the “Takings Clause”
83





Takings Clause provides that private property shall not be taken for public use 
without just compensation and the Due Process Clause provides that nobody 
shall be deprived of property without due process of law. In case law and 
literature, concerns about the objects of property play a very minor role.
 86
 
A wide range of intangible interests tend to be recognised as property for 
purposes of US constitutional property law because there were few concerns 
with this issue in private law and therefore it was unnecessary to set off 
constitutional law against a narrow private law tradition as in German law. The 
result is that a range of objects are regarded as property in US constitutional 
law, including some personal or creditor’s rights, the mainstream intellectual 
property interests, intangible commercial interests, certain social or welfare 
interests and the right to pursue certain legal remedies.
87
 
Similar to German law, not just any intangible interest of value is recognised as 
property in US law.
88
 Certain categories of intangible interests are not regarded 
as constitutional property, such as general financial interests falling short of 
being identifiable assets,89 contingent future interests such as prospective clients 
for a business
90 and benefits that derive directly from the government, such as 
80 
Fifth Amendment 1791. DA Dana & TW Merrill Property: Takings (2002) 1: The Fifth Amendment, as 
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81 
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future social security payments.
91
 This indicates that in US law a wide range 
of intangibles are recognised as property for constitutional purposes, but the 
mere fact that an intangible interest is valuable does not necessarily qualify 
it as property. This is similar to the position in German law, where interests 
amounting to mere expectancies or contingent interests and general financial 




In accordance with its established practice, the Constitutional Court of 
Moldova applies the ECHR’s principles regarding the determination of 
whether a particular interest is a possession for purposes of Article 1 ECHR 
and therefore property for the purposes of Article 46 of the Moldovan 
Constitution. The term “possession” is interpreted broadly by the ECHR 
and includes claims as well as legitimate expectations of acquiring property 
rights. The autonomous meaning doctrine also applies to the interpretation of 
possessions and allows the ECHR to look beyond the domestic law definition 
of property of the relevant member state. This prevents member states from 
thwarting the protection of Article 1 ECHR by legislating interests as not 
being property. The ECHR’s approach to determining which interests are 
worthy of constitutional protection appears to begin from a constitutional 
perspective. It does not rely on a private law notion as a point of departure 
and then expand from there as it becomes necessary. This is evident from 
the application of the autonomous meaning doctrine, which allows the ECHR 
to ignore any domestic law notion of property and independently determine 
if a particular interest is a possession for purposes of Article 1 ECHR. This 
broad, constitutional approach to the interpretation of “possessions” allows 
for intangible interests to be more easily recognised and protected as property.
Both German and US law have a wide constitutional notion of property that 
begins with the private law concept but then, in the case of German law, goes 
beyond it. The constitutional notion of property in these two jurisdictions 
includes most well-known and recognised rights and interests in property, 
both real and personal, regarding both tangible things and intangibles. US law 
appears to end up in the same place as German law to the extent that a wide 
definition of property is recognised for constitutional protection, with roughly 
similar categories of non-property interests excluded in both systems, such 
as a person’s general wealth or mere expectations. The German and US law 
approach therefore differs from that of the ECHR, because both systems begin 
with a private law notion of property and then, in the case of German law, 
goes further by developing a wider constitutional interpretation of property.
The South African Constitutional Court’s approach of interpreting property 
widely and incrementally adding interests to the concept of property is similar 
91 
Flemming v Nestor 363 US 603 (1960); Board of Regents v Roth 408 US 564 (1972); Town of Castle Rock, 
Colorado v Gonzales 545 US 748 (2005). See further Goldberg v Kelly 397 US 254 (1970). In this case the 
Supreme Court was willing to accept that social security payments are worthy of protection as far as the 
Due Process Clause of the property guarantee was concerned, but not for purposes of the Takings Clause: 
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92 
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to the German, ECHR and US law approach to the interpretation of the concept 
of property. The construction the South African Constitutional Court uses is 
probably the most similar to German law even if not explicitly followed. In 
other words, the private law, narrow notion is used as the starting point and 
incrementally a wider constitutional notion is developed by courts. The 
Constitutional Court has acknowledged that the private law notion of property, 
while useful, cannot be the only consideration when determining if a particular 
interest should be protected as property under section 25 of the Constitution.
The similarity between the jurisdictions discussed in this article is that each 
interprets the notion of property for constitutional purposes very broadly and 
they each arrive at a very broad notion of property despite having different 
points of departure. It is this broad constitutional notion of property that 
allows for the recognition of interests, particularly intangible interests, as 
constitutional property that would perhaps not have been regarded as property 
under the private law, narrower notion of property. However, not just any 
intangible interest will necessarily be regarded as property. For example, 
German and US law require that rights seeking recognition must vest in 
the one attempting to claim them and must not be a mere expectancy of a 
right or benefit. Similarly, Article 1 ECHR protects claims and the legitimate 
expectation of acquiring property rights. It does not protect any and all 
expectations, only those that are regarded as legitimate within the meaning of 
the ECHR’s case law. In South Africa, the incremental approach to expanding 
the notion of constitutional property means that each particular intangible 
interest will first be examined and the Constitutional Court will determine if 
the particular intangible interest should be regarded as constitutional property.
If something similar to the Moldovan case discussed above were to come 
before the BVerfG or the US Supreme Court, we think the outcome would 
perhaps be similar to that reached by the Moldovan Constitutional Court, 
namely that the expectation is legitimate, and it would therefore be protected 
as constitutional property because both German and US law protect legitimate 
expectations as constitutional property. In the South African context, the 
outcome would perhaps also be the recognition and protection, based on the 
Constitutional Court’s incremental approach to the expansion of the definition 
of constitutional property in South African constitutional property law and 
its wide interpretation of the concept of property for constitutional purposes. 
SUMMARY
This article investigates how the question of recognising intangible interests as constitutional 
property is approached in the constitutional property law regimes of Moldova, Germany, the European 
Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”), the United States of America (“US”) and South Africa. It is also 
investigated whether Moldova and South Africa, being examples of relatively young constitutional 
democracies, follow an approach to the recognition of intangible interests as constitutional property 
that is perhaps similar to that of the established constitutional democracies of Germany and the 
US. This article concludes that each of the jurisdictions investigated do allow for the recognition of 
intangible interests as constitutional property, despite their diverging approaches to this question. 
The Constitutional Court of Moldova follows the approach of the ECHR regarding the recognition 
of intangible interests as constitutional property. The Constitutional Court of South Africa uses an 
approach that is doctrinally similar to that of German constitutional property law, though German law 
is not specifically followed.
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